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United States v. McOmber, A Brief Critique 
By: Captain Fred Lederer, JAGC, Instructor, 
Criminal Law Division, T JAGSA 
DA Pam 27-50-42 
The facts of United States v. McOmber 1 are 
simple. Airman McOmber was implicated in the 
theft of a tape deck and given his Article 
3l(b)-Miranda warnings by an Agent C. 
DA Pam 27-50-42 
McOmber requested counsel and was referred to 
the area defense counsel. Two months later (and 
after McOmber's defense counsel had discussed 
the case with the agent) the same agent inter-
viewed McOmber about the tape deck theft and 
other thefts. Completely warned, McOmber 
made an incriminating written statement. The 
agent did not give notice to McOmber's attor-
ney. The Court of Military Appeals, per Chief 
Judge Fletcher, held "that once an investigator 
is on notice that an attorney has undertaken to 
represent an individual in a military criminal in-
vestigation, further questioning of the accused 
without affording counsel reasonable opportu-
nity to be present renders any statement ob-
tained involuntary under Article 31(d) of the 
Uniform Code." 2 It should be noted that the 
Government had conceded that the defense 
counsel should have been notified but had ar-
gued that the failure to do so was not prejudi-
cial. 
At its best, McOmber is a long delayed deci-
sion limiting the possibility of police circumven-
tion of the rights to counsel given by Miranda v. 
Arizona 3 and Massiah v. United States. 4 At its 
worst, the opinion appears analytically unsound 
and may suggest unnecessarily a major change 
in military criminal law. The dilemma is caused 
by Judge Fletcher's attempt to avoid coming to 
grips with the constitutional issue, relying in-
stead "on statutory grounds," 5 grounds which I 
suggest are questionable at best. 
Courts across the United States have failed to 
definitively decide the issue that faced the 
Court of Military Appeals. 6 The positions have 
ranged from that taken by past military deci-
sions, allowing questioning with full warnings 
and waiver but without notification to counsel, 7 
to the New York rule that prevents waiver 
without the physical presence of the attorney 
whose presence is to be waived. 8 Notification to 
counsel has been defended as necessary to en-
sure full compliance with the Supreme Court's 
decisions in Miranda and Massiah and to pre-
vent subtle coercion to waive counsel rights. 
The problem with McOmber is not in its ultimate 
holding but in its rationale. Indeed the members 
of the Court have indicated unhappiness with 
the prior notification rule for some years. 9 
6 
Chief Judge Fletcher desired to avoid the 
sixth amendment constitutional issue-a desire 
particularly appropriate in light of the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Middendorf v. 
Henry. 10 Accordingly he based his holding that 
notification was required on Article 27 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 
§ 827 (1970). The primary difficulty is that Arti-
cle 27 deals with assignment of counsel for spe-
cial and general courts-martial-or in short for 
purposes of trial. The Court of Military Appeals 
expressly held in United States v. Clark 11 that 
there is no right to counsel at interrogations 
other than the right specified in Miranda. 
Where then does this notification provision 
come from? It is well and good to find that, once 
counsel is assigned, effective assistance of coun-
sel requires notification of interrogations. How-
ever, is that required when counsel are assigned 
despite Article 27 rather than because of Article 
27? 
The Court of Military Appeals held in 1973 in 
United States v. Clark 11 that United States v. 
Ternpia 12 had incorporated into military law 
only the minimum requirements of Miranda and 
that paragraph 140(a) (2) of the MANUAL FOR 
COURTS-MARTIAL, despite its apparent clear 
meaning, could not be interpreted to give any 
greater rights. The only reference of note to 
rights to counsel at interrogations in the Manual 
is paragraph 140(a) (2), and Judge Darden's 
opinion presents the strong inference that no 
statutory right to counsel at interrogations 
exist-such a right coming only from Miranda. 
How can Article 27 affect the issue? The Court 
seems to be saying that effective assistance of 
counsel at trial requires effective assistance of 
counsel at an interrogation. This is surely 
reasonable but can this be said when there is or-
dinarily no general statutory right to counsel at 
interrogations? The reader of M cOrnber would 
be tempted to conclude that the source of the 
new notification provision is either based in 
paragraph 140(a) (2) or in the constitutional 
provisions giving rise to Miranda or Massiah. 
Yet, the opinion denies these possibilities. 
McOmber leaves the reader in mystery. Chief 
Judge Fletcher states that a statement obtained 
in violation of the new notification provision will 
result in the statement obtained being excluded 
pursuant to Article 31 (d) which includes state-
ments obtained in violation of Article 31 (which 
fails to mention counsel at all) "or through the 
use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful 
inducement." 13 Does failure to notify constitute 
coercion or unlawful influence? Such a conclu-
sion seems difficult to draw although exclusion 
could easily be dictated by Miranda or Mas-
siah. 
7 
Because of the unusual phrasing of the 
McOmber opinion-an opinion that certainly 
appears correct in terms of result-more legal 
questions may have been created than have 
been resolved. As it is difficult to find the source 
of the statutory right that Chief Judge Fletcher 
makes use of, it may be that the Court has now 
found a new right to counsel at interrogations. If · 
so, this new right may be grounded in Article 
27, or, unlikely as it seems, 14 in Article 31, or in 
the court's supervisory power over military 
justice-exercised perhaps to make Articles 27 
and 31 truly meaningful. In view of this lack of 
clarity we can only hope for later cases to re-
solve this perplexing question. 
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